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The Latest Cybersquatting Trend: Typosquatters,Their 
Changing Tactics, and How To Prevent Public 
Deception and Trademark Infringement 
Dara B. Gilwit∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an era when technology dominates, the Internet has become an 
indispensable and expedient source for a wealth of information. From 
purchasing clothes and cars, to dating and corresponding with people 
across the globe, the Internet is the modern day choice for 
instantaneous communications. Many businesses, relying heavily on 
customer website usage, distinguish products through their 
trademarks, which indicate quality and help develop brand names.1 
Thus, using trademarks as domain names helps businesses to create a 
strong presence on the Internet.2 Yet, domain name registration, once 
a convenient identification method for consumers, has become a 
profitable venture for clever entrepreneurs such as cybersquatters.  
A cybersquatter is a party who possesses no legitimate interest in 
a trademark and attempts to profit by registering the trademark as a 
domain name before the rightful trademark owner can do so.3 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. Yasaman Navai, Note, Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman Market Inc., Protecting 
Against Cybersquatting or extending the Allowable Reach of Trademark Law on the World 
Wide Web, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 191, 191 (2001). Consumers rely 
primarily on brand names when participating in online commerce. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 5 
(1999). 
 2. “A domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it 
facilitates communication with a customer base.” Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 
141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (quoting MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)). A company should use its trademark as a domain name to ensure that its site 
is easily located. Id.  
 3. Jonathan M. Ward, Comment, The Rise and Fall of Internet Fences: The Overbroad 
Protection of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 5 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
211, 215 (2001) (quoting Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill. 
1996)).  
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Cybersquatters then resell or license the domain name back to the 
company that spent millions of dollars expanding the trademark’s 
goodwill.4 Considering that businesses today rely on the Internet and 
electronic commerce—either by exclusively selling their products on 
the Internet or using the Internet as an advertising and information 
venue—preventing domain name infringement by cybersquatters has 
become increasingly important.5  
Emerging as the newest type of cybersquatter is the 
“typosquatter.”6 In an attempt to gain traffic to their “rogue” site, 
typosquatters register common misspellings of domain names for 
popular websites, and for variations of a trademark.7 For example, a 
person registered the domain name “ebwold,” eliminating the “r” 
from Electronic Boutique’s trademark protected domain name, 
“ebworld.com.”8 A typical typosquatter does not adopt the registered 
trademark of another in their domain name.9 Instead, typosquatters 
 
 4. Id.  
 5. See Colby Springer, Comment, Master of the Domain (Name): A History of Domain 
Name Litigation and the Emergence of the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 315, 324 
(2001). See also S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999). 
 6. Robert Cumbow perhaps coined the term “typosquatter” and was one of the first to 
recognize this expanding sub-species of cybersquatters. Robert C. Cumbow, “Typosquatters” 
Pose Threat to Trademark Owners on the Web, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1998, at S2. See also 
EyeOnDomain.com, at http://www.eyeondomain.com/misspelled_domains.html (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2002) (providing links to many typo piracy scams).  
 7. Cumbow, supra note 6; Ward, supra note 3, at 216. See also Andy Johnson-Laird, 
Looking Forward, Legislating Backward?, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 95, 101 (2000) 
(explaining the phenomenon of typosquatting as “companies that register mistyped variants of 
popular domain names to catch the electronic crumbs dropped by careless web surfers.”); 
Douglas M. Isenberg, Trademarks and the Internet: Four Lessons That Have Emerged in 2000-
01, 32 UWLA L. REV. 227, 231 (2001).  
 8. Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1705 (E.D. Pa. 
2000), motion to set aside overruled by 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 765 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001), 
aff’d, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9247 (3d Cir. Apr. 24, 2002). Electronics boutique registered the 
domain name “www.ebworld.com” for its online store. Id. at 1708. The defendant, Zuccarini, 
then registered the name, “www.ebwold.com” and “www.ebworl.com.” Id. at 2. When users 
looking to link to Electronics Boutique accidentally deleted the letters “r” or “d,” they were 
barraged with advertisements featuring products such as credit cards, answering machines, 
games and music. Id. The Internet user was “mousetrapped” and thus unable to exit the 
advertisements without clicking on them. Id. For every click, Zuccarini made between ten and 
twenty-five cents. Id.  
 9. John Menton, Cybersquatters and Typosquatters, COMM. TODAY, Aug., 2000, at 2, at 
http://www.commstoday.com/law/aug_00.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2002).  
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will seek out websites that have heavy traffic.10 The typosquatter will 
then register those domain names that users are most likely to make 
typographical errors with when accessing.11 Typosquatters also 
register domain names that eliminate the dot after “www.”12 
Essentially, the goal of a typosquatter is to divert traffic to their 
website and use this traffic to produce advertising revenues.13  
Compared to the number of traditional cybersquatting cases, the 
number of typosquatting cases is relatively small.14 Most recently, 
though, in Shields v. Zuccarini,15 the Third Circuit held that 
typosquatting is a violation of the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act16 (ACPA).17 Though the ACPA provides an adequate 
remedy for trademark owners against typosquatters who trick 
consumers, prevention is a more efficient means of dealing with 
typosquatters.  
Part II of this Note presents an overview of the domain name 
system and domain name disputes that may arise concerning the use 
of trademarks as domain names. It discusses the general problem 
with cybersquatters and with typosquatters, as well as past and 
present procedures for dealing with them. Part III deals with the most 
recent case law, particularly the Shields18 case, that allows trademark 
owners to bring lawsuits against typosquatters. Part IV addresses a 
future typosquatting scenario and ways to deal with it. Part V 
presents a proposal for preventing typosquatting altogether.  
 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. The court recently granted the corporation, Paine Webber, a preliminary injunction 
restraining one typosquatter from using the domain name “wwwpainewebber.com.” Paine 
Webber, Inc. v. wwwpainewebber.com, No. 99-0456-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6552, at *2 
(E.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1999). When users typed in the defendant’s address, it linked them to a 
pornographic web site. Id. 
 13. See 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1705; Bob Sullivan, “Typosquatters” Turn Flubs into Cash, Sept. 
22, 2000, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-502915.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).  
 14. Ward, supra note 3, at 222.  
 15. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 17. 254 F.3d 476. Most case law dealing with typosquatters involves actions where the 
typosquatter mousetraps consumers.  
 18. Id.  
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II. DOMAIN NAMES AND CYBERSQUATTING 
A. The Domain Name System 
1. Definition of a Domain Name 
The Internet is a network of computers that allows both 
individuals and organizations to share information globally.19 
Computer users can access millions of websites and web pages via 
the Internet.20 A web page is a computer data file, which may have 
words, names, messages, pictures, sounds and links to more 
information.21 Every web page possesses its own website, which 
functions as its address.22 A numeric identifier called an Internet 
protocol address, or “IP” address, identifies the tangled web of data 
on the Internet.23 Similar to a street address or telephone number, IP 
addresses tell the Internet user’s computer where to go on the web for 
information.24 Because an IP address is not decipherable by the 
average Internet user, computers use an easier system consisting of 
domains and domain names to look for information.25  
A domain name identifies an Internet site by using a unique name, 
often a person’s or company’s name or trademark.26 Each domain 
name has two separate parts: (1) the top-level domain (TLD) located 
at the end of the domain name, which indicates the kind of use or the 
country designation; and (2) the second level domain name (SLD), 
which identifies the specific Web site owner with a string of words 
that precedes the TLD.27 For example, some TDLs are “.com,” 
 
 19. Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). See 
also Donna Frazier Schmitt, Intellectual Property and Technology 1 (2001) (unpublished course 
material for Entertainment Planning & Drafting at Washington University School of Law, on 
file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy) (discussing the Internet and 
different ways to access it.).  
 20. 141 F.3d at 1318.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Springer, supra note 5, at 318-19.  
 24. 141 F.3d at 1318.  
 25. Springer, supra note 5, at 319.  
 26. Isenberg, supra note 7, at 230.  
 27. Julianne Ross Davis, Protecting Your Trademark on the Internet, THE FED. LAW., 
July 2000, at 23, 25. See also Navai, supra note 1, at 194; Springer, supra note 5, at 320; Davis, 
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“.org,” and “.edu.” 28 Thus, to locate a site on the World Wide Web, 
the SLD (“domain name”), the TLD, and the standard string 
citation—“http://www”29—must be entered.30 
A domain name is the easiest method for accessing a website.31 
An Internet “search engine”32 helps computer users locate specific 
domain names.33 After typing in a key word search, the computer 
produces all of the websites, usually hundreds, which contain the key 
word.34 Individuals and companies favor an identifiable domain name 
to make it simpler for users to locate their website.35  
2. Domain Name Registration  
In 1995, the U.S. Internet authorities and the National Science 
Foundation contracted Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) to register the 
.com, .net, and .org domain names, and to handle domain name 
disputes.36 However, in November 1998, the Department of 
 
infra note 36, at 554.  
 28. Davis, supra note 27, at 25. The domain suffix of “.com” refers to a commercial 
enterprise; “.org” indicates that the Web site is an organization; “.edu” signifies an educational 
institution. Id. The current TLD system now includes seven new suffixes: “.biz” for business; 
“.coop” for cooperative businesses; “.info” for anyone; “.museum” for museums; “.name” for 
personal web sites; “.pro” for licensed professionals such as accountants, lawyers, and doctors; 
and “.aero” for air transport. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(“ICANN”), available at http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). On November 
16, 2000, the ICANN board selected these seven new TLDs for negotiation of agreements, 
which would permit the inclusion of the TLDs in the Internet’s domain-name system. These 
new TLDs are the first since 1988—aside from other country-code TLDs—to be on the 
Internet. See ICANN, supra. See also Craig Pintens, Comment, Managing the “Team” on the 
Field, Off the Field, and in Cyberspace: Preventing Cybersquatters from Hijacking Your 
Franchise’s Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 299, 304 (2001) (providing definitions 
for the new top-level domains). 
 29. The “http://” means Hypertext Transfer Protocol and the “www” to the “host,” stands 
for World Wide Web. Navai, supra note 1, at 194 n.16.  
 30. Id. at 194.  
 31. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319. 
 32. A “search engine” is a website or software program that searches an online database 
and then gathers and reports “matches”—information that contains or is related to specific 
terms. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), 
available at www.dictionary.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. G. Gervaise Davis III, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: History and Recent 
Developments in Domestic and International Disputes: Enabling Electronic Commerce on the 
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Commerce created an agreement with the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a newly formed non-profit 
corporation, to manage the Domain System and shift some control 
away from NSI.37 The United States government amended its 
agreement with NSI so that individuals wanting to register a domain 
name have a choice of registrar services and prices.38  
To register a domain name in the United States, an applicant files 
for a domain name with an ICANN Accredited Registrar.39 The 
system functions such that each registrar forwards its information to a 
main registry, which keeps the authoritative list of domain names and 
addresses.40  
The registrar, through a master NSI database, registers most U.S. 
domain names automatically.41 A person can register by simply 
submitting the proper application and the requisite fee.42 The only 
systematic check that the registrar makes is to check whether anyone 
else has an existing identical domain name.43 Additionally, the 
automated system does not review for similarities in domain names.44 
Consequently, the system computers would automatically register 
both “businessclient.com” and “business-client.com” as two 
completely different domain names.45 Because the system is  
 
Internet, 670 PLI/Pat 551, 562 (2001).  
 37. ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 1083 (2d ed. 2000). ICANN took control over Internet address space allocation, domain 
name system management, protocol parameters, and root server system management. Schmitt, 
supra note 19, at 4.  
 38. MERGES, supra note 37, at 1083. Domain name registration fees vary depending on 
the registrar and the TLD. For instance, a domain name in Moldova (.md) is presently more 
expensive than a .com domain name. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 2.  
 39. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 2. Initially, only NSI could register these domain names; 
however, since ICANN expanded the number and location of official registrars to more than 
100 in the past several years, it is questionable whether NSI still maintains extensive control 
over the registry. See also Davis, supra note 36, at 562-63. An international listing of 
companies currently accredited and functional in addition to NSI is located at 
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation-qualified- list.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). 
 40. MERGES, supra note 38, at 1083.  
 41. Davis, supra note 36, at 563.  
 42. Ward, supra note 3, at 215.  
 43. Davis, supra note 36, at 563.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
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automated and many businesses try to use the same domain names, 
registrars operate on a first-come, first-serve basis.46  
3. Trademarks as Domain Names 
It is very important for a trademark owner to use their trademark 
as a domain name.47 If an Internet user does not know the domain 
name of a company, a user may conduct a search on the Internet for 
the company’s trademark.48 To ensure that a user gets to their site 
easily, it is to the benefit of the company to use its trademark as a 
domain name.49 In turn, when a company cannot use its trademark as 
a domain name because another Internet user registered the name 
first, the trademark owner’s ability to profit from their mark 
decreases.50  
It is important to note, however, that possessing a trademark does 
not automatically trigger ownership or the use of the same word or 
phrase as a domain name.51 A trademark owner must register their 
trademark with ICANN to secure ownership and use.52 In general, 
while courts have not held that the mere registration of a trademark as 
a domain name constitutes trademark infringement per se,53 suits 
against cybersquatters are valid under the law and courts have 
enforced injunctions against such use.54 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. Navai, supra note 1, at 195. 
 48. Id. at 195-96 (citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319).  
 49. Id. at 196. (citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319).  
 50. Id.  
 51. See Schmitt, supra note 19, at 2.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Lisa T. Oratz, Trademarks and the Internet 4 (Sept. 2001), at http://www. 
lawyerpages.com/attorney/article23.htm (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).  
 54. Id. See, e.g., Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. 
v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1997); Planned Parenthood Federation v. Bucci, 42 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Comp Examiner Agency v. Juris, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20259 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1996); Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int’l, 1996 US Dist. 
LEXIS 20814 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996); Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 
1996); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1479 (W.D. Wash 1996); 
Toys’r’Us v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Systems v. Instruction Set, 
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).  
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B. Cybersquatting 
1. Definition of Cybersquatting 
Direct cybersquatting is when a person registers a trademark 
owner’s mark as a domain name without a bona fide claim to use the 
trademark.55 Subsequently, cybersquatters try to sell the domain 
name back to the owner of the registered trademark.56  
Registrars do not check whether applicants possess the right to use 
the trademark as a domain name.57 For their request to be approved, 
applicants merely need to make a good faith claim to the domain 
name.58 Because domain names are registered on a first-come, first-
serve basis, and only one party may register a particular domain 
name, cybersquatters quickly capitalized upon trademark owners’ 
procrastination in registration.59  
2. The Problem with Cybersquatters 
The practice of permitting domain names to be registered on a 
first-come, first-serve basis furthers the domain name infringement 
problem. The registration system encourages unethical parties such as 
cybersquatters to beat out a rightful trademark holder in the 
registration process so that they can take the domain name hostage 
and request reparation from the trademark holder.60 Fundamentally, 
cybersquatters threaten the most basic objectives of trademark law, 
which is “reducing the customer’s costs of shopping and making 
 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. The most infamous cybersquatter is Dennis Toeppen, who registered the 
trademarks of over 100 major corporations as domain names and successfully sold them back to 
the companies for as much as $15,000. See Oratz, supra note 53, at 5 (citing Panavision, 141 
F.3d 1316). One of these companies, Panavision International, successfully brought an action 
against Toeppen. See infra text and accompanying notes 95-102. See also supra note 52.  
 57. Ward, supra note 3, at 215 (citing Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. Trademark owners tend to think of cybersquatters as “exploitative and parasitic.” 
Menton, supra note 9, at 1. Conversely, cybersquatters see themselves as clever entrepreneurs, 
bestowing trademark owners with a service, which they neglected to provide for themselves. Id.  
 60. Springer, supra note 5, at 322. 
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purchasing choices.”61 An item bearing a trusted trademark allows a 
purchaser to easily and immediately determine that item’s quality, 
history, and dependability.62 Trademark law ensures that a producer, 
and not its competitor, will receive the financial and reputation-
related rewards linked with a desired product.63 Domain name 
infringement by cybersquatters weakens the fundamental trademark 
principle of consumer protection by permitting ruthless competitors 
to benefit from the mark holder’s good will and reputation.64  
3. A Newer Phenomenon: Typosquatting 
Typosquatting is a more recent sub-class of cybersquatters. A 
typical typosquatting scenario involves “mousetrapping.”65 If 
mousetrapped when misspelling a domain name, Internet users find 
themselves barraged with advertisements and are unable to get out of 
the website they originally accessed.66 Another typosquatting 
scenario involves a typosquatter that registers a variation of a 
trademark and sets up a website that promotes views opposite that of 
those views found on the trademark owner’s site.67 For some, 
typosquatting bait and switch tactics that turn traffic into revenue 
from phony advertising has grown into a full-fledged business 
enterprise.68  
 
 61. Brookfield Communications, 174 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)). See Springer, supra note 5, at 324.  
 62. Springer, supra note 5, at 324.  
 63. 174 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64).  
 64. Springer, supra note 5, at 325.  
 65. See 254 F.3d at 480. 
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998); Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  
 68. See Sullivan, supra note 13. At the heart of the scheme are a number of companies 
that register domain names that are slight variations of well known websites such as 
yyahoo.com, wwwaol.com and www-msn.com. Id. Stoneybrook Investments, Powerclick, Inc., 
Global Net 2000, Inc., and Data Art Corp. have together registered hundreds of these sites 
according to the NSI database of domain name registrations. Id. Evidently, accidental clicks 
generate a large volume of business. Id. In February of 2000, Powerclick generated five cents 
per click with about 200,000 daily visitors. Id. At that rate, the company claims to be making 
nearly $4 million a year in revenues. Id. This is not surprising considering that the traffic 
received from typosquatting is not minimal. Id. Statistics indicate that about 20,000 clicks are 
sent every day from wwwhotmail.com; 10,000 from myyahoo.com; and well over 200,000 are 
redirected. Id.   
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C. Dealing with Cybersquatters 
1. Traditional Litigation Against Cybersquatters 
Trademark owners wishing to bring suit for infringement file a 
claim under either the Lanham Act69 or the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act70 (FTDA).71 Traditional actions for domain name 
disputes fall into three categories under the Lanham Act:72 [1] 
trademark infringement, arising under § 32;73 [2] confusion of source 
infringement, arising under § 43(a);74 and [3] dilution of a famous 
mark, arising under § 43(c),75 also termed the FTDA.76  
a. Trademark Infringement and Confusion of Source: Sections 
§ 3277 and § 43(a)78  
A trademark owner might bring a cause of action under these 
sections when a party misappropriates their trademark for use as its 
own domain name and provides similar or competing goods of the 
actual trademark holder.79 Potentially, users who are angry, 
frustrated, or believe the desired site does not exist may end their 
search for the correct web page when they reach a different site than 
 
 69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (Supp. 2001).  
 70. Id. § 1125(c).  
 71. Before bringing an action, a trademark owner may send a “Cease and Desist” letter to 
the owner of a site to alert them of the claimed infringement. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 8. 
Because most infringers are not aware of the consequences for using another’s trademark, this 
letter gives them the opportunity to comply or be forced into legal action. Id. If a trademark 
owner sends a cease and desist letter, it must be done after a thorough investigation. Id. 
Moreover, a trademark owner must recognize the possibility that a party may respond by filing 
an action for Declaratory Judgment. Id. 
 72. The majority of domain name dispute cases are federal. Some states also have laws 
providing for causes of action for domain name disputes. Ward, supra note 3, at 217 n.41. This 
Note only addresses federal remedies because of the significant influence of federal law in this 
area. Id. (citing the same proposition).  
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).  
 74. Id. § 1125(a). 
 75. Id. § 1125(c). 
 76. See Ward, supra note 3, at 217. Additionally, § 43(d), creating a cause of action for 
bad faith registration, falls under the Lanham Act, but will be discussed later in this Note.  
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).  
 78. Id. § 1125.  
 79. See Springer, supra note 5, at 327.  
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they set out to find.80 Consequently, the owner of the misappropriated 
trademark/domain name may lose a sale, either because the customer 
discontinues his or her search, or the competitor takes away the 
customer from present and future purchases.81  
The latter scenario transpired in Brookfield Communications, Inc. 
v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,82 when the plaintiff, Brookfield 
Communications, tried to register the domain name “moviebuff. 
com.” The request was denied because West Coast Entertainment had 
already registered this domain name.83 The court held that Internet 
users might confuse the plaintiff’s database with the defendant’s 
website because of the similarity between Brookfield’s “Movie Buff” 
movie database software and West Coast’s online site for movie sales 
at “moviebuff.com.” In general, the court pointed to the products’ 
relatedness, and to both entities’ use of the web as a marketing and 
advertising forum.84 Hence, in order to test for trademark 
infringement, the court adopted the standard of likelihood of 
consumer confusion as to the actual source of goods or services.85 
The underlying theory for this standard is that such confusion may 
prevent consumers from getting the goods they seek, or may damage 
the reputation of the first user of the mark by association with the 
second user.86  
 
 80. Id. (citing Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D.N.J. 1998). 
Moreover, “[t]he seemingly endless list of potential sites found on a search engine might deter 
Internet users from searching for a particular web site.” Id. (citing Teletech Customer Care 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).  
 81. See Springer, supra note 5, at 327 (making the same proposition).  
 82. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 83. 174 F.3d at 1042.  
 84. Id. at 1057. The similarity of trademarks and domain names does not automatically 
mean that consumer confusion exists. The relatedness of the products or services offered and 
the simultaneous use of the web as a marketing and advertising forum must be considered. Id. at 
1055.  
 85. Id. at 1053–54. Generally, to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, a party must 
establish that the public believes that the mark’s owner authorized the use of the trademark. Id. 
To assess the consumer’s “likelihood of confusion” in the marketplace, the court employs the 
following factors: (1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the services; (3) 
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) 
likely degree of purchaser care and sophistication; (7) intent of the defendant in selecting the 
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines using the marks. Id. at 1053. See also 
§ 1114 (1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)(A); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (using the same factors to set the precedent test for consumer confusion). 
 86. See Springer, supra note 5, at 328 (quoting DeCosta v. Viacom, Int’l, 981 F.2d 602, 
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b. Dilution: Section 43(c)87 
Before the passage of the ACPA, the Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act (FTDA)88 was the popular method for trademark holders to fight 
cybersquatters.89 The FTDA became a favorite because it does not 
require a likelihood of confusion through the use of the marks, like 
§§ 3290 and 43(a)91 require.92  
The FTDA provides a famous or distinctive mark owner with 
injunctive relief against another person’s commercial use of a mark 
that after becoming famous dilutes93 the distinctive quality of the 
mark.94  
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen95 was one of the first 
 
605 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 923 (1993)).  
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
 88. Id.  
 89. See Ward, supra note 3, at 219; see also Springer, supra note 5, at 329. 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).  
 91. Id. at § 1125.  
 92. See Ward, supra note 3, at 219.  
 93. Dilution means “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the 
owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Dilution can occur in two forms. First, blurring is “when a defendant 
uses the plaintiff’s trademark to identify the defendant’s goods or services, creating the 
possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s 
product.” Springer, supra note 5, at 329 n.79 (citing Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey, 
Combined Shows v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). Second, 
tarnishment is “when a famous mark is improperly associated with an inferior or offensive 
product or service thereby causing the good name associated with the trademark to be 
tarnished.” Id. (citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d. Cir. 
1996)). 
 94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). To determine whether a mark is famous or distinctive 
a court may consider the following factors:  
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and 
extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark 
is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the 
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of 
trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of 
recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks’ 
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent 
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was 
registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the 
principal register. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000).  
 
 95. 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998). Panavision affirmed the decision of Intermatic, 
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cases to expand dilution protection of trademarks to domain names.96 
Panavision established dilution as the primary remedy for trademark 
owners against cybersquatters.97 In Panavision,98 the court held that 
Toeppen’s actions diluted the value of Panavision’s trademark 
because “potential customers of Panavision [would] be discouraged if 
they [could not] find its web site by typing in Panavision.com, but 
instead were forced to wade through hundreds of web sites.”99 
Essentially, the registration of “panavision.com” weakened 
Panavision’s capacity to identify and distinguish its goods on the 
Internet.100 Consequently, Panavision, the actual owner of the mark, 
was unable to create an association between Panavision’s domain 
name and their goods.101 The court believed that this inability 
diminished the impact and power of the Panavision mark on 
consumers’ minds.102 Currently, courts tend to find in favor of the 
trademark holder, but there are boundaries to the dilution theory of 
trademark/domain name use.103  
 
Inc. v. Toeppen, which also extended dilution protection of trademarks to domain names. See 
Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See Ward, supra note 3, at 221 
(discussing Intermatic and Panavision for the same proposition).  
 96. 141 F.3d at 1327.  
 97. Ward, supra note 3, at 221.  
 98. 141 F.3d 1316. 
 99. Id. at 1327.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Springer, supra note 5, at 329 (citing 141 F.3d at 1326). 
 102. Id. at 329-30 (citing 141 F.3d at 1327).  
 103. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the defendant’s use of the registered trademarks of the plaintiff—“Avery” and 
“Dennison”—as domain names was not dilution because the defendant registered the name 
under “.net” as opposed to “.com.”); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (upholding defendant’s registration of “/ballysucks” as a subdivision of 
their domain name as non-dilutive because of the First Amendment’s preemptory protection of 
speech and expression). The Framers of the FTDA were mindful that free speech, fair use, 
opinion, and commentary must be permitted under the First Amendment. Springer, supra note 
5, at 331 n.91 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S38, 559 (Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) and 
quoting Senator Orrin Hatch as saying that the dilution statute would “not prohibit or threaten 
noncommercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression that 
are not a part of a commercial transaction.”). To qualify as a parody, the website must be used 
in commerce. The following constitute commercial activity under the Lanham Act: “solicitation 
of funds, promotion of products, diversion of Internet user from the trademark holder’s web 
site, and hyperlinks to other commercial sites.” Schmitt, supra note 19, at 8. See also Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of AM. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); OBH, Inc. v. 
Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000).  
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2. Recent Procedures for Dealing with Cybersquatters: The 
ACPA and the UDRP 
In 1999, two events occurred creating a legal and more rational 
basis for resolving domain name disputes: the legislation of the 
ACPA and ICANN’s adoption of the Uniform Disputes Resolution 
Policy (UDRP), including the UDRP Rules.104 
a. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act105  
Congress amended the Lanham Act by enacting the ACPA.106 In 
general, Congress believed that infringement and dilution actions did 
not create a sufficient remedy for domain name registration abuses, 
especially for cybersquatters.107 Recognizing that cybersquatters 
altered their tactics to avoid infringement and dilution actions, 
Congress passed the ACPA.108 Congress’ goals in enacting the ACPA 
included “protect[ing] consumers and American businesses . . . 
promot[ing] the growth of online commerce, and . . . provid[ing] 
clarity in the law for trademark owners.”109 Specifically, Congress 
hoped to prevent cybersquatting “by prohibiting the bad-faith and 
abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names 
with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such 
marks.”110 
To bring a successful action against a cybersquatter under the 
ACPA, a court must make three determinations.111 First, the court 
 
 104. Ward, supra note 3, at 222-23.  
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 106. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 3 (1999). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) on 
cyber-piracy prevention.  
 107. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999). See also Ward, supra note 3, at 223; Isenberg, 
supra note 7, at 236-37.  
 108. See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999). Cybersquatters avoided infringement by either 
posting a site that was unrelated to the trademark owner’s business or not using the domain 
name for a website. Ward, supra note 3, at 223. Similarly, cybersquatters prevented a dilution 
claim by avoiding the solicitation of offers to sell the legitimate trademark to owners, thus 
circumventing case law precedent that construed offers to sell domain names as forms of use in 
commerce. Id.  
 109. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).  
 110. Id.  
 111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  
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must decide whether at the time of registration the contested mark 
was distinct or famous.112 Second, the court must decide whether “the 
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the mark.”113 
Third, the court must determine whether the domain name holder 
registered the mark as a domain name in bad faith, such as with an 
intent to profit from the mark’s and the domain name’s similarity.114 
If the dependant acts in bad-faith, Congress provides for an award of 
statutory damages to deter cybersquatters from bad-faith and abusive 
conduct, and to adequately compensate trademark owners for the 
latter conduct.115  
 
 112. Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and Internal Auctions, 2001 
U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 224 (2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2000)).  
 113. Id. at 224-25. 
 114. Id. at 225 (citing § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000)). To avoid subjective motivations in 
determining bad-faith and intent, the ACPA lists nine factors for the court to use when deciding 
the intent of domain-name registrants. These factors include:  
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the 
domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of 
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; (III) the 
person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide 
offering of any goods or services; (IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair 
use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the person’s intent to 
divert consumers from the mark owner’s online location to a site accessible under the 
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for 
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a 
likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the 
site; (VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to 
the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an 
intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or 
the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (VII) the person’s 
provision of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the 
registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional failure to maintain accurate 
contact information, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; 
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the 
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive 
at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others 
that are famous at the time of registration, . . . without regard to the goods or services 
of the parties; and (IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person’s 
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 115. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2000). No bad-faith can be found and the court will not 
award statutory damages if the defendant believed, and the court finds such belief to be 
reasonable, that the defendant registered or used the domain name fairly or lawfully. S. REP. 
NO. 106-140, at 10 (1999). The court can award the trademark owner up to $100,000 in 
statutory damages for each infringing domain name. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2000). See also 
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Since its enactment, the ACPA has been invoked successfully 
against cybersquatters.116 Though the ACPA does not explicitly 
provide for a cause of action against typosquatters, there is case law 
that expands the ACPA’s scope to encompass them.117  
b. The UDRP  
Originally, NSI adopted a Domain Name Dispute Policy to deal 
with conflicting registrations and trademark issues.118 Because the 
policy did not resolve the problem nor satisfy the participants,119 in 
1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce established the ICANN, 
which devised a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).120 The 
ICANN designed the UDRP as an alternative form of dispute 
resolution to combat cybersquatting.121 In the event a trademark 
owner believes that another party infringed on his or her trademark 
by registering it as a domain name, he or she can initiate UDRP 
arbitration.122  
 
Parchomovsky, supra note 112, at 225 n.70 (2001) (explaining two purposes for awarding 
statutory damages: guaranteeing that the trademark owner receives just compensation for the 
suffered loss, and encouraging domain name registrants to settle for fear of losing $100,000 if 
they litigate until the end). If the court establishes bad-faith on the part of the domain name 
registrant, it can also forfeit, cancel, or transfer the domain name to the owner of the mark. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C) (2000).  
 116. See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 
2001); Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001); 
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 118. Davis, supra note 36, at 562.  
 119. See id. There are many differences between the previous Network Solutions Dispute 
Policy and the UDRP system. See Schmitt, supra note 19, at 4. First, while Network Solutions 
placed the mark on “hold,” the new UDRP system does not because it takes a shorter period of 
time to make decisions compared to formal court proceedings. As such, if the complaining 
party’s claim is upheld, the UDRP will transfer the domain name. Id. Second, while NSI 
formerly only recognized federally registered trademarks, the UDRP acknowledges state and 
common law trademarks, service marks, and foreign and federally registered trademarks. Id. 
Third, compared to NSI’s stricter “identical” standard, the UDRP employs a test of “identical or 
confusingly similar.” Id. Finally, where NSI’s policy applied regardless of the registrant’s 
intent, UDRP requires a party to demonstrate that the registration was in bad-faith. Id.  
 120. Davis, supra note 36, at 562. The UDRP was adopted August 26, 1999, but became 
effective January 3, 2000. Ward, supra note 3, at 236 n.147.  
 121. See generally Ward, supra note 3, at 229-34. 
 122. See Symposium, Trademarks and the Internet: Four Lessons That Have Emerged in 
2000-01, 32 UWLA L. REV. 227, 241 (2001). To initiate UDRP arbitration, a party files a 
complaint either with Disputes.org, the National Arbitration Forum or the World Intellectual 
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D. Typosquatting Case Law 
1. Shields v. Zuccarini123  
In 2001, the Third Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
held that typosquatting was a violation of the ACPA.124 In Shields v. 
Zuccarini,125 the Third Circuit expanded protections under the ACPA 
by acknowledging that the protection of registered domain names and 
other types of intellectual property include typosquatting.126  
 
Property Organization (WIPO), which are all approved providers. UDRP, available at 
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2002). See also Schmitt, supra 
note 19, at 4. The UDRP requires the filing party to submit in the complaint that the registrant is 
using a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to their trademark, the registrant 
has no legitimate interest in the domain name, and the applicant registered is using the name in 
bad-faith. See Isenberg, supra note 7, at 241. The challenged domain holder receives the 
complaint and must send a response. See Schmitt, supra note 19, at 4. Next, an administrative 
panel, made up of either one or three arbitrators depending on the complainant’s selection, 
reviews the complaint and the response. Id. The costs for the administrative hearings depends 
on the number of domain names in the complaint and if the complainant chooses one or three 
panelists. Id. Further, each approved service provider’s basic fee differs. Id. Each provider 
usually arrives at its own unique standards and decisions. Id. As a result, practitioners often 
assess the decisions from each state to decide which offers them the best venue for their dispute. 
Id.  
 123. 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 124. Id. See also Ray Hartman, Federal Appeals Court Recognizes Protection Against 
Typosquatting, at http://www.gcwf.com/articles/cyber/typos.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) 
(expanding upon the Shields decision). Other typosquatting cases have come before the court, 
but only recently have they been decided under the ACPA. See Bargain Bid v. Ubid, No. 
99CV7598, 2000 WL 978706 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining defendants whom registered the 
domain name “barginbid.com” allegedly to divert consumers away from Bargain Bid’s website 
with the use of a common misspelling of “bargain,” from using the Bargain Bid marks and from 
indicating that Bargain Bid sponsored, affiliated, or approved defendants’ services); Electronics 
Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. Civ. A. 00-4055, 2000 WL 1622760 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 
30, 2000) (holding that a defendant who registered domain misspellings of the popular website 
for Electronics Boutique violated the ACPA and was enjoined from using the domain 
misspellings, required to pay statutory damages per domain name plaintiff’s attorney’s fees). 
Typosquatting cases have also come before the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) arbitrators. For instance, when a domain name “wholesaler” registered numerous 
misspellings of the Wall Street Journal, WIPO arbitrators held that he had to relinquish to the 
Wall Street Journal the registered misspellings, namely www.wallstreetjounal.com and 
www.wallstreetjournel.com. Rob Hassett & Suellen Bergman, Cybersquatting: The New Age of 
URLs and Their Impact on Trademarks, at http://www.internetlegal.com (last visited Nov. 4, 
2002). Additionally, in Microsoft Corp. v. Microsof.com aka Tarek Ahment, Microsoft was 
assigned “microsof.com.” Id. (citing WIPO Case No. D2000-0548).  
 125. 254 F.3d 476.  
 126. See generally id. Though the ACPA did not explicitly discuss typosquatting, the court 
in Shields decided that such offending websites are a “classic example” of what the ACPA 
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The plaintiff, Joseph Shields, worked as a graphic artist who 
designed, exhibited, licensed, and marketed the Joe Cartoon animated 
creature for more than fifteen years.127 In June 1997, Shields created 
a website with the registered domain name Joecartoon.com.128  
In November 1999, Zuccarini registered five variations of 
Shields’s original website.129 These sites included: joescartoon.com, 
joecartoon.com, joescartons.com, joescartoons.com, and 
cartoonjoe.com.130 Upon reaching Zuccarini’s site, visitors were 
“mousetrapped” and needed to click on various advertisements to exit 
the site.131  
In its analysis, the court applied the three factors needed to 
succeed on an ACPA claim—whether the mark was famous or 
distinctive at the time of registration, whether the domain name is 
“identical or confusingly similar to” the mark, and whether the 
domain-name registrant acted in bad faith.132 The court found Joe 
Cartoon to be “distinctive and famous” as a mark.133 Furthermore, the 
 
hoped to abolish. Hartman, supra note 124, at 1.  
 127. Id. at 479. Shields exhibited and marketed his creations with the names “Joe Cartoon” 
and “The Joe Cartoon Co.” Id. The popular “Frog Bleder,” “Micro-Gerbil,” and “Live and Let 
Dive” animations are some his original creations. Id. Shields licenses his cartoons nationwide to 
others who then use his characters on t-shirts, coffee mugs, and other items at gift stores. Id.  
 128. Id. After registering the domain name joecartoon.com, Shields has since held sole 
operation of the website. Id. Since winning the “shock site of the day” award from Macromedia, 
Joe Cartoon’s web traffic increased tremendously with approximately 700,000 visits per month. 
Id. Website visitors can download Joe Cartoon animations and purchase related merchandise. 
Id. Receiving ten to twenty-five cents every time a visitor clicks on an advertisement, Shields 
earns about $160,000 per year in advertising related to the website alone. Hartman, supra note 
124, at 1.  
 129. 254 F.3d at 479-80. 
 130. Id. at 480. 
 131. Id. Displayed on Zuccarini’s sites were advertisements for credit card companies and 
other sites. Id. When users mistakenly visited Zuccarini’s sites, they became trapped or 
“mousetrapped,” which meant they could not exit without clicking on a series of 
advertisements. Id. For every click, the advertisers paid Zuccarini between ten and twenty-five 
cents. Id. Zuccarini admittedly made $800,000 to $1,000,000 per year from more than three 
thousand web sites. Id. at 486. Zuccarini also admitted that he was “in the business of profiting 
from the public’s confusion and that he does not, in fact, profit from this confusion.” Id.  
 132. Id. at 482. See also supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.  
 133. 254 F.3d at 482-83. The court used seven factors to analyze whether Shields’s mark 
was distinctive or famous. Id. at 483. The court reasoned that the duration and uniqueness of the 
“Joe cartoon” enterprise, the popularity of his website, and the global commercial success of 
Joe Cartoon in both real and virtual markets made the mark distinctive and famous. Id. See also 
Hartman supra note 124, at 1 (interpreting the mark as distinct and famous for similar reasons).  
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domain names were “identical and confusingly similar” enough to the 
Joecartoon.com website that Internet users would be confused by 
Zuccarini’s site.134 Finally, the court found that Zuccarini acted in 
bad-faith and with intent to commercially exploit Shields’s protected 
mark,135 and thus, found in favor of Shields.136 Holding that 
typosquatting is a violation of the federal law against cybersquatting, 
Shields137 illustrates the Third Circuit’s willingness to broaden the 
scope of the ACPA beyond the plain language in order to better fulfill 
the Act’s explicit goals.138 
 
 134. 254 F.3d at 483. The five domain names registered by Zuccarini “closely resemble 
‘joecartoon.com,’ with a few additional or deleted letter, or rearranging of the ordering of the 
words.” Id.  
 135. Id. at 486. Utilizing a nine-factor analysis, the court concluded that Zuccarini acted in 
bad-faith and was not protected by any of the Act’s safe harbor provisions. See also supra note 
114 (discussion of nine-factor analysis). Specifically, the court rejected Zuccarini’s First 
Amendment fair-use protection defense. Id. After filing the suit, Zuccarini converted his 
original web page to a “political protest” page, where he warned of the evils contained on the 
original site. Id. at 480. However, the court rejected Zuccarini’s attempt to avoid the provisions 
of the ACPA and held that Zuccarini used the infringing domain names for commercial 
purposes and not for “fair-use” reasons. Id. at 485-86.  
 136. Id. The court held in favor of Shields awarding him $10,000 per offending website, 
his attorney’s fees, and an injunction. Id. at 486-88. The ACPA provides for statutory damages 
if a party violates § 1125(d)(1) “in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than 
$100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.” Id. at 486 (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(d) (2000)). Additionally, the ACPA provides that “the court in exceptional cases may 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” Id. at 487 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) 
(2000)). In traditional trademark infringement cases, a court must find that the losing party had 
“culpable conduct . . . such as bad faith, fraud, malice or knowing infringement before a case 
qualifies as ‘exceptional’.” Id. The court found that Zuccarini acted willfully and in bad-faith 
when he, with the intention of confusing people and diverting Internet traffic to his own 
websites for financial profit, registered the “Joe Cartoon” domain name. Id. at 487. Thus, the 
court held that Zuccarini’s actions, coupled with his “lack of contrition,” constituted an 
“exceptional” case, entitling Shields to his attorney’s fees. Id. Additionally, the court issued a 
permanent injunction against Zuccarini. Id. at 486. The court held that because a finding of 
likelihood of confusion meant a finding of irreparable injury, Shields was entitled to a 
permanent injunction. Shields would “suffer damage to his reputation and a loss of goodwill if 
Zuccarini is allowed to operate his offending web sites.” Id. Largely, Shields’ livelihood and 
fame depended on Internet users’ ability to access his sites without being trapped in Zuccarini’s 
sites or barraged by images displayed therein, which users may attribute to him. Id. Thus, 
without the permanent injunction, Shields would be irreparably harmed. Id. Moreover, because 
Zuccarini has more than three thousand of these websites, his harm from the financial loss of 
the five websites would be miniscule. Id. The court further noted that “public interest . . . is a 
synonym for the right of the public not to be deceived or confused.” Id. Consequently, the 
injunction was in the public’s best interest. Id.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Hartman, supra note 124, at 3.  
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E. How a “Telesquatter” Decision may Affect Future Typosquatter 
Litigation 
1. The Case of Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservations, Inc.139 
The 1996 Sixth Circuit case of Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 
Reservation, Inc.140 presented a similar typosquatting scenario—
“telesquatting.”141 This case involved the use of a telephone number 
as opposed to a domain name. Unlike Shields,142 the court in Holiday 
Inns, Inc.143 held against the trademark owner.144 In Holiday Inns, 
Inc.,145 Holiday Inns filed a Lanham Act suit against the defendants, 
claiming unfair competition and infringement of its trademark 
telephone number, 1-800-HOLIDAY, known as a “vanity 
number.”146 The defendants, Call Management Systems, Inc.,147 800 
Reservations, Inc.,148 and Earthwinds Travel Inc.,149 obtained the use 
and were engaged in using the number 1-800-H[zero]LIDY 
(“complimentary number”), which Holiday Inns’s customers 
 
 139. 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 140. Id. 
 141. The author of this Note coined the terms “telesquatting” and “telesquatter” when 
discussing Holiday Inns, Inc., supra note 139, to compare with the term “typosquatter.”  
 142. 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 143. 86 F.3d 619. 
 144. Id. at 626. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 620. Holiday Inns, Inc. operated an international chain of hotels worldwide 
using the name “Holiday Inn.” Id. The hotel chain advertised extensively and sold its products 
and services nationwide. Id. Additionally, Holiday Inns, Inc., registered several service marks, 
one of which is the “Holiday Inn” mark, with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 
Holiday Inn has expended a tremendous amount of time, money, and effort to increase 
travelers’ awareness of its 1-800-HOLIDAY phone number. Id. The vice-president of 
marketing for Holiday Inns, Inc., claims that virtually all of the company’s media, print, and 
radio advertisements feature the vanity number. Id. However, the telephone number itself is not 
a registered trademark. Id.  
 147. Call Management Systems, Inc. is “a consulting firm that obtains and services 1-800 
telephone numbers for businesses.” Id. at 620.  
 148. 800 Reservations, Inc., is “an agency that makes reservations for a number of hotel 
chains, including Holiday Inns.” Id.  
 149. Earthwinds Travel, Inc., is “a travel agency.” Id. Call Management made a verbal 
agreement with Earthwinds, agreeing that Earthwinds would process calls from customers on 
the complimentary number in exchange for ten percent of all hotel booking commissions. Id. at 
621. Furthermore, the parties agreed that until 800 Reservations could start operations on its 
own, Earthwinds would answer calls on this 800 service. Id. However, 800 Reservations 
eventually terminated and reactivated this agreement. Id.  
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frequently but mistakenly dialed.150  
Ultimately, the court held that the defendants’ use of the 
complimentary number did not violate the Lanham Act.151 The court 
explained that the defendants did not use Holiday Inns’s trademark 
nor any derivation of it.152 Further, the defendants did not create 
public confusion.153 In fact, the court recognized the likelihood that 
the defendants actually lessened public confusion by answering calls 
that would have gone unanswered, and instead telling callers that 
they misdialed.154 The court refused to stretch the plain language of 
the Lanham Act because the defendant neither used Holiday Inns’s 
protected mark nor created a confusing or misleading representation 
of the mark.155 
III. THE FUTURE FOR TYPOSQUATTERS 
Although the Third Circuit held that typosquatting actions 
involving mousetrapping are a violation of the ACPA,156 real world 
cases, whereby an entrepreneur relies on consumer mistake to sell a 
competing good,157 foreshadow a future typosquatting tactic that 
could come before the court. A typosquatter might register a variation 
 
 150. Id. Holiday Inns, Inc.’s customers often unintentionally substitute the number zero for 
the letter “O” when dialing Holiday Inns, Inc.’s 1-800-HOLIDAY number. Id. When Call 
Management’s owner realized that 1-800-HOLIDAY’s complimentary number was not 
subscribed, he reserved it for his service. Id. at 620-21. According to Call Management, a 
common mistake made by consumers is dialing the number “0” (zero) for the letter “O.” Id. at 
621. The trend of misdialed vanity numbers is so well recognized that businesses and hotels, 
such as the Marriott and Red Roof Inns, register both their vanity and complimentary numbers 
to make certain they entertain all potential customers’ calls. Id. In the instant case, Holiday Inn 
did not take a similar precaution. Id. The owner acknowledged that his “sole purpose” for 
choosing the complimentary number was to “intercept calls from misdialed customers who 
were attempting to reach Holiday Inns.” Id. Furthermore, he admitted that his company gained 
benefits in direct proportion to Holiday Inns’s marketing efforts to obtain reservations with 1-
800-HOLIDAY. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 625.  
 155. The court explained that “[given] the creative nature of the scheming mind, the law 
cannot hope to spell out every forbidden act but must be content with the general rules which 
limit competition to that which is fair and ‘stop people from playing dirty tricks’.” Id. 
 156. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 157. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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of a domain name for a popular website, but instead of 
mousetrapping consumers, offer them a similar, less expensive 
product than the popular site.158  
By following the court’s holding in Holiday Inns, Inc.,159 
trademark owners with popular websites risk losing a traditional 
trademark infringement action against a typosquatter.160 At the same 
time, following the Holiday Inns, Inc.161 decision supports fair 
competition and, in turn, benefits consumers. Suppose a 
typosquatter’s actions resemble those of the telesquatter, whereby the 
typosquatter visibly indicates to a consumer on their website that the 
consumer reached the site in error. The court might reason as it did in 
Holiday Inns, Inc.,162 that the typosquatter did not use the actual 
trademark to create any consumer confusion—it merely took 
advantage of the confusion that consumers produced themselves.163 
Additionally, a court may not view the typosquatter as confusing 
consumers because the typosquatter immediately disclosed the 
mistake to them. By following the Holiday Inns, Inc.164 rationale, a 
court would support fair competition by providing consumers with 
the opportunity to purchase the typosquatter’s competing goods or 
services.  
On the other hand, rejecting the Holiday Inns, Inc. analysis would 
 
 158. For instance, a typosquatter used the domain name address “wwwcarpoint.com,” 
which eliminates the period after “www,” to offer a similar service in competition with 
Microsoft’s popular Carpoint car buying service. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 6 (1999). Though 
there are examples of typosquatters attempting to sell competing goods or services, it is unclear 
as to whether lawsuits have been brought against them.  
 159. 86 F.3d 619. 
 160. See also Cumbow, supra note 6, at 4. Cumbow explains that the analysis in Holiday 
Inns, Inc. suggests that the owner of a popular website, such as “www.anysite.com,” would be 
unsuccessful against someone who promoted a competing business at “www.amysite.com” in 
an infringement action. Id.  
 161. 86 F.3d 619. 
 162. Id.  
 163. See Cumbow, supra note 6, at 3 (reasoning that the Defendant in Holiday Inns, Inc. 
“had not created any consumer confusion; it had only taken advantage of confusion that 
consumers had created for themselves.”). In Panavision Int’l L.P., the court found Toeppen’s 
reliance on Holiday Inn inapplicable because the 800-number in Holiday Inn involved a 
misdialed number, where Toeppen’s challenged domain name incorporated the actual 
trademark “Panavision.” Id. at 4 (citing 141 F.3d at 1325). Unlike Toeppen, a typosquatter does 
not use a trademark but rather a variation of it, which suggests that Panavision’s reason for 
rejecting Holiday Inn, Inc. would not apply in a typosquatting case.  
 164. 86 F.3d 619. 
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protect trademark owners from typosquatting actions, while impeding 
fair competition and disadvantaging consumers. To escape Holiday 
Inns, Inc.’s165 rationale, a court could set forth the trademark doctrine 
of “initial interest”166—but only if the typosquatter failed to visibly 
indicate their mistake to consumers. The case of Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Pegasus Petroleum Corp167 established the rationale of the initial 
interest doctrine.168 In this case, the Second Circuit found a likelihood 
of confusion between two marks: “Pegasus,” used for petroleum 
products, and the winged horse logo, used by Mobil Oil.169 Though a 
customer would quickly realize that Pegasus was not associated with 
Mobil, and in turn become “unconfused,” the court found that 
consumers’ initial interest in the defendant’s products and services 
resulted in enough confusion to injure the trademark, and thus sustain 
a cause of action.170  
Though providing an indication to consumers that they mistakenly 
reached a site would quickly eliminate confusion as to the source of 
the goods or services, failing to indicate so might cause a consumer 
to confuse a typosquatter’s goods or services with those of the 
trademark owner. This initial association would be enough to injure 
the trademark owner’s goodwill. Yet a ruling against the typosquatter 
in this scenario would prevent fair competition and would deprive 
consumers of the right to purchase competing goods.  
Whether or not a court applies a Holiday Inns, Inc.171 analysis 
depends largely on whether the typosquatter visibly indicates to the 
 
 165. Id.  
 166. Cumbow, supra note 6, at 4.  
 167. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).  
 168. See Cumbow, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum 
Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987) in support of the “initial interest” doctrine).  
 169. Id.  
 170. In the case of Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., the court held that the unauthorized 
use of comedian Jeff Foxworthy’s trademark phrase on t-shirts injured his trademark despite 
that purchasers knew the shirts did not come from Foxworthy and that confusion created an 
association in the consumer’s mind who traded on the goodwill of Foxworthy’s trademark. 
Cumbow, supra note 6, at 4 (citing 879 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D. Ga. 1995)). Furthermore, the court 
in Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc. held that although a customer knew upon 
entering the store that it was not Blockbuster, using the name “Video Busters” initially attracted 
customers by trading on Blockbuster’s established reputation. Id. (citing 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994)). 
 171. 86 F.3d 619. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p267 Gilwit note book pages.doc  1/14/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:267 
 
consumer that they have reached the wrong site. If a typosquatter 
provides no indication of a mistake, the court may be less likely to tip 
the scale in favor of fair competition and the typosquatter, as initial 
interest confusion could injure the trademark. On the other hand, a 
typosquatter’s indication of a mistake to consumers may eliminate 
confusion and reduce the consumer’s undue and unnecessary search 
costs, which makes it more difficult to justify a cause of action in 
trademark law.172 Under these circumstances, a court would be more 
inclined to rule in favor of fair competition and the typosquatter.  
One may not rationalize the conflict between trademark 
infringement and unfair competition as easily under the ACPA. 
Typosquatters face a stricter standard under the ACPA, as it 
eliminates a finding of likelihood of confusion as to source because 
its focus centers around the registrant’s bad-faith intent.173 
Essentially, the ACPA leaves less room for the types of varying 
interpretations evidenced under traditional trademark claims.174  
Ultimately, while it is less clear whether a traditional claim for 
trademark infringement would withstand a Holiday Inns, Inc.175 
analysis,176 there is still a strong likelihood that courts will follow the 
trend of bringing typosquatters to justice under the ACPA.  
 
 172. Trademark law requires a showing of a likelihood of confusion. If this cannot be 
shown then a trademark owner does not have an infringement claim. See supra notes 79-86 and 
accompanying text.  
 173. The ACPA does not concentrate on the costs incurred by the consumer, but rather on 
the intent of the infringer. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.  
 174. A typosquatter’s showing that they provided a consumer with a visible indication that 
they reached the site in error may on its face seem like a good-faith effort to not deceive 
consumers. However, the typosquatter’s mere intent to divert consumers to their website 
through the use of a domain name that is confusingly similar would likely be viewed as bad-
faith in itself. The typosquatter knew that the domain name was confusingly similar to the mark 
of another because otherwise they would not have registered the domain name in the first place. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A)(VIII) (2000).  
 175. 86 F.3d 619. 
 176. See also Cumbow, supra note 6, at 4.  
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IV. RESOLVING THE TYPOSQUATTING PROBLEM 
Despite the attempts of the ACPA and UDRP to solve 
cybersquatting, many commentators suggest that both procedures 
have weaknesses and do not adequately address the problem.177 These 
suggestions imply that there are inadequacies for dealing with 
typosquatters as well. The ACPA and UDRP provide trademark 
owners with a means to deal with typosquatters after they register a 
domain name in bad faith and begin using it on the Internet. 
However, few preventative measures are in place to deter 
typosquatters from registering the domain names in the first place.178 
Whether through the courts or UDRP arbitration, initiating legal 
action has many drawbacks.179 Therefore, changes should be 
instituted to minimize the need for such legal actions.  
A. Trademark Owners Take Charge 
The most obvious solution to preventing a typosquatter from using 
a trademark as a domain name is for trademark owners to register as 
many variations of their domain names as possible.180 
 
 177. Many view the bad-faith requirement under the ACPA as too subjective, which may 
lead to inconsistent rulings against cybersquatters. See Ward, supra note 3, at 232-35 
(discussing the deficiencies of both the ACPA and the UDRP). In addition, some criticize the 
UDRP for its lack of monetary relief, its inability to handle complex trademark claims and non-
trademark claims, and its lack of a clear basis for bad-faith. See Sandra Edelman, 
Cybersquatting Claims Take Center Stage, 18 COMPUTER INTERNET LAW. 1, 4-5 (Jan. 2001) 
(discussing the disadvantages of UDRP arbitration). See also Parchomovsky, supra note 115, at 
227 (discussing the UDRP’s misguided reliance on good-faith). See also id. at 229 (suggesting 
that disputed domain names be distributed according to the party that values it the most to 
promote economic efficiency); Springer, supra note 5, at 359 (addressing the ACPA’s and the 
UDRP’s failure to address the actual problem).  
 178. By providing for an award of statutory damages, the ACPA established one method 
for deterring cybersquatters. See Parchomovsky, supra note 115, at 240 n.70 (explaining that 
statutory damages deter cybersquatters from registering domain names in bad-faith).  
 179. The downfalls of bringing a lawsuit in court include but are not limited to “(i) cost, (ii) 
the long length of time of actions and, (iii) the level of proof needed to show a likelihood of 
confusion (the test for Trademark infringement) or that a Trademark was famous enough to 
garner dilution protection (only famous marks are protected outside their specific goods and 
services).” Schmitt, supra note 19, at 3.  
 180. The Treasury Department’s Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the agency that 
oversees the operation of U.S. financial institutions has dealt with their concerns over the 
typosquatting problem by alerting and advising banks to carefully select domain names. Hassett 
& Bergman, supra note 124, at 16. Further, the agency encouraged banks to register variations 
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Nameengine.com conducted a study, which demonstrated that other 
parties have registered 265 domain names of the Fortune 500 
companies.181 Further, only 163 of the Fortune 500 companies 
actually own a majority of the registrations of their own name.182 The 
study indicates that many companies are not actively nor sufficiently 
policing their names.183 Newer businesses in the process of creating 
websites, should also be encouraged to register variations of their 
domain names. Businesses could thereby preempt future typosquatter 
actions that target their domain names.184  
B. A Notice System 
A more thorough domain name registration process that includes a 
notice system may be the solution to trademark infringement by 
typosquatters—and by many cybersquatters for that matter.185 
Typosquatters differ from the general class of cybersquatters in that 
they register domain names after a trademark owner has already 
established a domain name using their trademark. Whether the 
 
of their domain names to prevent consumer confusion, such as bank customers entering 
confidential information into other similar websites by mistake. Id. See also Menton, supra note 
9, at 1 (suggesting that businesses should consider the permutations of their name using 
hyphens or additional words and register their trade mark under all TLDs in which it currently 
trades or thinks it will trade in the future.).  
 181. Pintens, supra note 28, at 324 (2001) (quoting Majority of Fortune 500 Have More of 
Their Domain Names Pirated than they Actually Own, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 2, 2000, at 1).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (citations omitted). Many companies are already proactive in fighting 
cybersquatters. See Schmitt, supra note 19, at 7. For instance, Verizon Communications acted 
aggressively to combat cybersquatting by registering more than 500 domain names to guard 
each of its business units and products. Id. Included in the names was Verizonsucks.com. Id. 
Though Verizon actively tried to fight cybersquatters, within a few months of Verizon’s entry 
into the market, outsiders still registered 400 domains incorporating the name Verizon or one of 
its other brands. Id. One of the names registered was Verizonreallysucks.com. Id. See also 
Menton, supra note 9, at 1 (suggesting monitoring search engines for typosquatting).  
 184. Preempting cybersquatters is important because cybersquatters act very quickly. For 
instance, within hours of the birth of the UK Prime Minister’s son, Leo Blair, cybersquatters 
registered the domain names www.leoblair.com and www.babyleo.co.uk. Menton, supra note 9, 
at 1. Thus, registering variations of domain names before publicly introducing new brands or 
products will stop typosquatters before they strike.  
 185. Despite the active role of businesses in policing their marks, cybersquatters are still 
successful at pirating names. See infra note 187. Given this fact, a more thorough registration 
system is even more important.  
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typosquatter registers first is irrelevant186 because typosquatters seek 
out sites with high traffic. Accordingly, preventing them from 
registering an alternative might be easier than finding a flawless cure 
for the damage done.  
The institution of a system whereby trademark holders receive 
notice when someone attempts to register their trademark or a 
variation of it is a potential solution. Such a system could coexist 
with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and receive the same 
listings of registered trademarks. Each time someone attempts to 
register a domain name, a search company—similar to those 
companies used to monitor their web sites for the use of its 
trademarks and service marks187—would check it against the PTO 
list. Upon finding a name that is the same or similar, the service 
would then send notice to the trademark holder. Additionally, the 
owner of the allegedly infringing domain name would be required to 
prepare a detailed report of his or her intentions for use, which they 
would then submit to the trademark owner. Upon receiving a copy of 
the report, the trademark owner would decide whether or not to 
permit the use of the domain name. To promote fair competition and 
prevent trademark owners from arbitrarily and blindly denying others 
the registration of marks, the service will review the report and, in 
accordance with standards similar to those found in the ACPA, 
monitor the legitimacy of the trademark owner’s denial. For example, 
the service would consider whether the domain name registrant is 
 
 186. Conversely, the problem of cybersquatting arises because cybersquatters register a 
trademark as a domain name before the rightful trademark owner. See supra notes 56-58 and 
accompanying text.  
 187. Numerous companies hire search companies to monitor their web sites for its 
trademark and service mark’s use by others. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 7. For example, one 
service called Thomson and Thomson searches the Internet for a trademark and then reports the 
“hits” with archived pages and a link to the allegedly infringing site. The only downfall is that 
the service does not filter authorized uses or irrelevant uses of words used in the trademark. Id. 
Cyveillance is another company whose services include searching in text and visuals for the 
mark. Id. Though costlier than other services, Cyveillance provides an extra element to its 
service by having people actually review the sites, and according to a list of criteria, rank the 
top fifty sites that seem to pose the most harm. Id. The reports of the fifty sites include the 
archived page, a brief summary of the usage in paragraph form, the names of the owners, and a 
categorization of either foreign or domestic, commercial or non-commercial. Id. See also 
www.cyveillance.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2002). Other companies providing such services 
include: eWatch, CyberAlert, and Net Currents. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 7.  
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using the name with a bad-faith intent, whether the domain name is 
likely to confuse consumers, and whether the name is being used 
commercially. Evaluating the registration of domain names under 
ACPA-like standards before granting permission to use the names 
would alleviate the need to bring a court action later under the 
ACPA.188  
Though costlier, the notice system will avoid the expense of court 
action or arbitration, which is ultimately more expensive. In addition, 
the system would reduce the time it takes for trademark owners to 
police their own marks.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the expanding nature of the Internet, trademark owners will 
inevitably face new problems with cybersquatters. The ACPA leaves 
less room for courts to rule in favor of a typosquatter than traditional 
infringement causes of action. Yet it is likely that typosquatters will 
change their tactics to adapt to such legislation. Ultimately, it is 
increasingly important to implement methods that will prevent 
typosquatters from profiting from the reputation, good name or 
trademark of third parties, and equally important to balance the 
public’s right not to be deceived.  
 
 188.  See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. 
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